ABSTRACT Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) has emerged as a significant advancement for Internet and mobile networks with various public safety network applications. An important use of IoT-based solutions is its application in post-disaster management, where the traditional telecommunication systems may be either completely or partially damaged. Since enabling technologies have restricted authentication privileges for mobile users, in this paper, a strategy of mobile-sink is introduced for the extension of user authentication over cloud-based environments. A seamless secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) approach using bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems is presented. It is shown that the proposed S-SAKA approach satisfies the security properties, and as well as being resilient to nodecapture attacks, it also resists significant numbers of other well-known potential attacks related with data confidentiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user anonymity, password guessing, and key impersonation. Moreover, the proposed approach can provide a seamless connectivity through authentication over wireless sensor networks to alleviate the computation and communication cost constraints in the system. In addition, using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic, it is demonstrated that the proposed S-SAKA framework offers proper mutual authentication and session key agreement between the mobile-sink and the base station.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm where objects become part of the Internet. It has converged technologies in terms of sensing, computing, information processing, networking and controlling intelligent technologies [1] , [2] . Among the technologies converged we can count wireless sensor networks (WSNs), intelligent sensing, remote sensing, radio frequency identification (RFID), near field communications (NFC), low-energy wireless communications, and cloud computing. The technologies involved have particular applications in public safety as well as other domains such as health monitoring, smart homes and environments, smart cities, smart grid, and various types of pervasive systems [3] .
WSNs are composed of base-stations and numerous low cost mobility nodes which have restricted resources, such as communication, storage and computation cost. Each mobility node has its own sensing-unit, data-processing unit, module for short-range communication and power-supply unit [9] . Recently, WSNs have had its own prominence in various application fields, namely military (missile target tracking / detection system), environment (hazardous detection), biomedical (health monitoring and patient tracking) and building (smart-homing and threat detection). Since WSNs have limited power-supply unit for the mobility nodes, some researchers [7] , [8] have introduced the technique of mobilesink in the WSNs for the extension of network lifetime. Since the mobility nodes transmit the confidential data via wireless channels, any user may act as an adversary to overhear / tamper the confidential data being transmitted on the WSNs. Lately, Cloud Computing (CC) techniques have been further emerged as well with the WSNs' for the purposes of storage and data access at any time over the Internet [3] , [4] . In the cloud, the user can find the set of hardware devices, network connections, storage spaces, data services and application interfaces that are easily accessed over the Internet.
IoT architecture can be implemented as either Internet centric or object centric. The former aims at provisioning services within the Internet, where data are contributed by objects and vendors who deterministically deploy these objects, whereas the latter aims at provisioning services via network of smart objects. Scalability and cost efficiency of IoT services can be achieved by the integration of cloud-computing into the IoT architecture, i.e., cloudcentric IoT [50] . In a cloud-centric IoT framework, sensors provide their sensed data to a storage cloud as a service, which then undergoes data analytics and data mining tools for information retrieval and knowledge discovery [50] .
With the evolution of IoT, the global data networks are interconnected and accessed over CC networking systems [4] , [5] . As the sensing data are transmitted over public networks, the adversary can easily intercept the exchange of data between the users and the remote servers. This would cause various possible attacks, such as replay, key impersonation, stolen verifier, etc. [14] , [15] . As the CC has become a prominent domain for secure authentication, WSNs are in high demands of security schemes for the purpose of user authentication, authorization and accounting while the cloud services are being accessed by the legitimate users.
In literature, the gateway/base-station based authentication schemes have provided the lightweight authentication for the enrichment of security properties [10] - [22] . As a result, WSNs presume the gateway/base-station as imperative part to sense the real-time data over insecure networks. In this paper, users are referred as mobile-sink. In a state of proper access towards the sensor-node, the mobile-sink should complete the proper registration to establish an authorized session between the sensor-node and the base-station. In addition, the successful establishment of this communication can only be achieved through the satisfaction of mutual authentication and session-key agreement. Generally, the authentication schemes try to satisfy all the security properties of authentication and key protocol (AKA), such as mutual authentication, session key agreement, user anonymity, etc [14] . The analyses performed on the existing studies show that several authentication schemes are still susceptible for various potential attacks, such as privileged-insider, key impersonation, stolen smart-card etc. As a result, this paper presents a seamless secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) using bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems. The objective of this framework is to provide mutual authentication, session-key agreement, data confidentiality, user anonymity, intractability and resilient to node-capture attack, key impersonation, replay, stolen smart card, and privileged-insider.
In order to ease the computation and communication overhead, the authentication phase of S-SAKA does not invoke the base-station to authenticate the mobile-sink and sensornode; and thus the S-SAKA framework is more flexible than the three-party authentication scheme when mobile-sink is employed in the Cloud WSNs.
Since the pairwise keys are randomly distributed, the adversary may have a chance to obtain a common session-key to compromise the nodes. Das et al. [23] and He [24] presented a dynamic-identity based authentication scheme to resist the attacks, like privileged-insider and key-compromise. However, Das et al. and He's approaches are still vulnerable to the potential attack of node-capture. For the enhancement of security efficiency, Deebak [17] , Turkanović et al. [18] , Farash et al. [19] , Das et al. [20] , Amin and Biswas [21] and Srinivas et al. [22] have proposed lightweight user authentication schemes. However, their authentication schemes fail to mitigate the computation and communication efficiency of the network systems as they invoke the base-station authentication. This paper proposes the S-SAKA framework, which does not only to improve data security while using the mobile-sink in the WSNs, but also provides seamless connectivity over WSNs to reduce the computation and communication overhead.
The major contributions of S-SAKA framework are as follows:
1. The existing authentication schemes [17] - [22] are thoroughly analyzed to show various susceptibilities, such as privileged-insider, key impersonation, denial of service and password guessing. 2. To address the security weaknesses of existing schemes [17] - [24] , a lightweight S-SAKA framework is proposed that holds all the original merits of the existing schemes [17] - [22] to resist the potential attacks. 3. To strengthen the proposed S-SAKA framework, a formal security analysis is performed using BurrowsAbadi-Needham (BAN) logic [25] . Besides, the informal analysis is presented to claim that the proposed S-SAKA framework can be resilient to the attacks, which has not been analyzed in the literature to date. 4. Lastly, an experimental analysis is performed using MIRACLE C/C++ library to examine the computation and communication overhead of existing and proposed authentication frameworks. The evaluation result proves that the proposed S-SAKA framework provides less overhead as compared to existing authentication schemes. When detailed analysis is carried out with formal and informal verifications, it is observed that the proposed S-SAKA scheme provides less communication overhead in comparison with other existing authentication schemes in the literature [17] - [22] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the existing secure authentication schemes. Section III illustrates an architecture of hierarchical WSNs and discourses the mathematical assumption model using bilinear pairing. Section IV presents seamless secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) framework along with the security analysis. Section V shows the verification proof. Section VI compares the performance efficiency of proposed and existing authentication schemes. Finally, Section VII concludes this study
II. RELATED WORKS
Various natural or man-made disasters such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, nuclear power plant explosions cost significantly in terms of assets/infrastructure damage and more importantly human lives. The WSN based systems such as IoT solutions can help us to save lives since healthy communication and accurate information can make a real difference between life and death for those who are in the areas affected by the disasters. The exposure of sensitive information or similar attacks on confidentiality/integrity of information, and/or availability of resources can become an additional disaster in case proper countermeasures are not planned carefully.
With the modernization of the public safety communications, and the changes in application areas as well as new technologies introduced such as wearables, wireless body area networks, and variety of tracking devices that can be carried by responders such as rescue teams, fire fighters, and police, the IoT is expected to form a solid infrastructure for public safety applications [4] . Furthermore, although the enhancements especially in performance improvements of 3GPP LTE-A look very promising, during disaster situations these infrastructures can also be damaged or out of service [5] . There are some studies focussing on secure wireless powered device-to-device (D2D) communication in case the infrastructure is not available or partially functional [6] . However IoT based public safety networks (PSNs) are expected to have better availability in disaster scenarios since the computation is known to be more towards the distributed fashion.
Nowadays, sensor nodes are mostly used to sense the continuous data, event detection in real time environment and actuators control. These features are particularly useful for public safety applications. Specifically, micro sensing and seamless wireless connectivity became the promising technologies for various information and communication domains. These technologies are further extending for the classical categories, such as bio chemical processing, space exploration and disaster environment [9] . In order to offer better services to the users in WSNs, security is an important concern as the data transmission is performed over public networks [10] - [13] with the restrictions as follows:
1. Sensors are easily render to failure 2. Topologies of sensor networks change often 3. Sensor networks always prefer broadcast paradigms, but most of the Ad-hoc networks are point-to-point communication 4 . Sensors have limited power, computation and storage WSNs are one of the essential components of the infrastructures employed for establishment of IoT based public safety applications. Recently, security issues in WSNs have gained much attention of the researchers not only to satisfy the security properties of authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol but also to mitigate the computation and communication cost of the system. For the achievement of minimum overhead, several lightweight authentication schemes have been proposed [26] - [30] . Watro et al. [35] proposed the lightweight two-factor user authentication based on RSA cryptosystem for WSNs. However, the Watro et al. scheme [35] is vulnerable to replay, denial of service and key impersonation attacks [27] - [31] . Wong et al. [16] presented a lightweight user authentication scheme for WSNs, which only demands the computation of a hashing function. Later on, Srinivas et al. [22] show that the Wong et al. scheme [35] is vulnerable to stolen verifier and many logged-in users with the same login identity attack [27] - [31] . Tseng et al. [29] improved the version of Wong et al., which does not offer mutual authentication between the base-station and sensor-node [28] . To overcome the security weakness of mutual authentication, Lee [30] presented a novel password based dynamic user authentication scheme, which also fails to satisfy mutual authentication between the base-station and the sensor-node [28] .
Eschenauer and Gligor [32] presented a random based predistribution key mechanism to provide an initial trust between the sensor nodes. In random based key pre-distribution scheme, a key is randomly chosen from a key-pool and stored in the sensor node before it is deployed in the field. As a consequence, there are some certainties to have one common key for more than one sensor node. Chan et al. [33] improved this authentication scheme as two-key pre-distribution that has random pairwise-key and q-composite based key predistribution. Rasheed and Mahapatra [34] proposed a threetier authentication scheme to provide a pairwise key establishment between the mobile-sink and the sensornode. Nonetheless, the schemes, such as Chan et al. and Rasheed et al. have some serious security issues, namely user anonymity, intractability, privileged-insider and impersonation attack. Watro et al. [35] proposed an authentication scheme using Diffie-Hellman and RSA protocol as TinyPK scheme. But then, the TinyPK scheme is still susceptible to the masquerade attack [20] . To address this issue, Das et al. [20] introduced a two-factor user authentication scheme.
Chen et al. [37] shown that the Das et al. scheme is unsuccessful to provide the mutual authentication between the mobile-sinks and the sensor-nodes. To overcome the security weakness of Das et al. [23] , Chen and Shih [36] proposed a novel authentication protocol for WSNs. He [24] extended the authentication scheme of Das et al. [23] to resist attacks such as privileged-insider and key impersonation. Yuan et al. [28] presented a biometric based user authentication scheme, which has a similar architecture of Das et al. scheme [23] to satisfy the security properties of AKA protocol. However, the Yuan et al. scheme is susceptible to denial of service (DoS) and node compromise attack. VOLUME 5, 2017 Very few studies have focused on security issues for mobile-sink in WSNs [34] , [38] , [46] , [47] . Let us assume that the adversary wants to impersonate as a legal mobile-sink to sense the most sensitive information from sensor-node or pretend as a legitimate sensor to upload incorrect or pseudokind of messages to the mobile-sink. Owing to mobility in the wireless environment, most of the existing authentication schemes [20] , [37] , [39] - [41] are not well suited to authenticate the sensor-node and mobile-sink. As secure authentication scheme is believed to be essential to the mobile-sink in WSNs, this paper presents a novel seamless secure authentication scheme to improve the security efficiencies of the communication systems in terms of mutual authentication, session key agreement, user anonymity and intractability. The objectives of interaction and cooperation between the objects and the things are to send the data over wireless networks to signify the purpose of rapid development in the emerging technologies of IoT and cloud computing. In order to examine its common features and related discoveries, Stergiou et al. [48] presented a comparative study work, which focuses on the security issues of both the technologies. To provide the promising features, such as seamless interaction and interoperation, these technologies offer a smart home concept to associate the embedded computing technologies and network coverage. To solve the security and privacy preservation issues in the associated technologies, Tao et al. [49] presented a model of multilayer cloud. However, their architectural model fails to examine the mutual authentication and session key agreement between the communication entities.
Unlike the previous studies, S-SAKA framework tackles security issues, like data confidentiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user anonymity, intractability and resilient to node-capture, key impersonation, password guessing and stolen smart-card attack for WSN configurations using the mobile-sink while providing seamless connectivity over WSNs to reduce the computation and communication overhead.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, an architecture of a hierarchical WSN and the mathematical assumptions are discussed to signify the importance of the communication overhead and system security. The former is considered to mitigate the communication cost between the cluster head and the base station, whereby the network lifetime can be extended. The latter is derived to provide a better security mechanism to protect the system under various potential attacks, such as privileged-insider, replay, stolen smart-card and node capture. The important notation used in proposed S-SAKA is illustrated in Table 1 .
A. NETWORK MODEL
The purpose of mobile-sink is to collect and upload the sensing data to the base-station. The principle use of mobilesink is to mitigate the communication cost between clusterhead and base-station to enhance the network lifetime of the WSNs and reduce the communication overhead. The major disadvantage of the cloud-centric IoT is that it is usually based on a flat-topology structure that causes many problems such as scalability, increased traffic congestion among the nodes much closer to the sink (known as the broadcast storm), and an increase in overhead complexity. Therefore, clustering was introduced to subdivide the broadcast area into smaller cluster areas.
Many practical applications have had the model of hierarchical WSNs' for the purpose of power consumption; but then this paper is aimed to design a seamless secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) under the architecture of hierarchical WSNs' to provide one-time user authentication. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of the network model considered in this study. 24620 VOLUME 5, 2017 Fig. 1 shows that the sensor nodes are connected to cluster heads and cluster heads can communicate with each other as well as mobile-sinks. Dual way arrows on mobile sinks demonstrate the connections between sensor nodes and mobile sinks. For the cases where the communication is not within the range of the base station, the multi-hop data transmission can be employed; however, this can deteriorate the network lifetime and increase the communication overhead significantly. Hence, mobile-sinks can be employed which collects the sensed data from cluster head and upload it to the base station. The principle motivation behind the usage of mobile-sink in WSNs is to curtail the computation and communication overhead between the cluster head and the base station in order to enhance the WSNs lifetime.
B. MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS
In this subsection, the significance of Elliptic-Curve (EC) and Bilinear Pairing (BP) are introduced. In comparison with RSA, EC can provide better security level with minimum key length size [33] .
Elliptic Curve: Assume that p is a prime number and f p is a finite integer field with modulus p. Hence, an elliptic curve can be expressed as:
where a, b ∈ f p to satisfy the equation 4a 
In this aspect, the scalar multiplication of Q (x, y) on EC can be computed with the repetitive addition of n, i.e., P = P + P + P . . . . . . . . . + P (n times). The details of the assumptions can be found in [42] and [43] . Table 1 shows the important notation used in proposed S-SAKA framework.
Bilinear Pairing: Assume that G is a cyclic (additive) group generated by a key-point P K and G T is a cyclic (multiplicative) group. The group parameters, such as G and G T have same prime order q. Also, assumeê : G × G → G T be a computational bilinear mapping to satisfy the properties that are as follows:
where e is the identity of the group element G T .
Computability: Assume,ê(X , Y ) be an existing algorithm to compute the key-secrecy, for any X , Y ∈ G.
Mathematical Assumptions: To prove the importance of S-SAKA mechanism, some significant mathematical problems are derived from [44] and [45] that are as follows:
• Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Assume (P, Q) ∈ G to find an integer n ∈ Z * q such that Q = nP.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH ) problem: Assume P, Px, Py, Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z * q to determine xyP.
• Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH ) problem: Assume P, Px, Py, Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z * q to determine whether zP = xyP or z = xy (mod q).
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem: Assume P, Px, Py, Pz for any random integer x, y, z ∈ Z * q to determineê(P, P) xyz .
IV. SEAMLESS SECURE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT (S-SAKA) FRAMEWORK
In order to resolve the problem of security issue between mobile-sink and cluster-head, a framework of S-SAKA is proposed using bilinear-pairing. The S-SAKA framework is composed of seven phases: Initialization; System registration; Cluster-Head Registration; Mobile-Sink Registration; System Login; Authentication; Extraction of Sensing Data and secret key update. The mechanisms of S-SAKA are discussed in the following subsections.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, base station B St performs an initialization to generate the prerequisite parameters keys to publish the system requirements. The procedural steps are as follows:
Step 1: Bilinear parameters are generated q, P, G, G T ,ê , where G is a cyclic additive group that generate prime order integers q by P andê : G × G → G T is a bilinear group map.
Step 2: After the generation of bilinear parameters, B St chooses a random integer S ∈ Z * q as its corresponding master key to compute its public key p pub using p pub = S.P.
Step 3: After the generation of public key p pub , B St determines two secure collision resistance hashing operator H 1 and H 2 , where H 1 : {0, 1}
* is called as map to point hashing functional operation and H 2 : {0, 1}
* is a one way secure hashing.
Step 4: After the determination of hashing function, B St selects a symmetric encryption E S k (.) as the system encryption function.
Step 5: Lastly, B St publishes the system parameters q, P, G, G T ,ê, P, p pub , H 1 , H 2 , E S k (.) and keeps the secret parameters {S, x, y} confidentially.
The procedural steps can be represented as an illustrative diagram as follows:
B St performs an initialization 
B. SYSTEM REGISTRATION PHASE
Prior to the deployment of the system, the available mobile sinks and cluster-head should be registered with the base-station. This phase is composed of two-parts, namely cluster-head and mobile-sink registrations. In the S-SAKA framework, cluster-head and mobile-sink have its own unique identity, as CID i and PID j respectively. Moreover, the basestation B St has a database table DB S which is initialized to maintain the non-compromised cluster-head.
1) CLUSTER-HEAD REGISTRATION
Before the deployment of cluster-head CH i In WSNs', the base-station integrate a unique identity CID i to compute S.H 1 (CID i ), and then, the base-station stores back the computed value of S.H 1 (CID i ) in to the memory of CH i . Eventually, the base-station places CH i at an appropriate position and insert a new identifier CID i in the table of DB S . The cluster-head registration can also be represented as an illustrative diagram as follows:
2) MOBILE-SINK REGISTRATION
In this phase, the mobile-sink M S which is authorized would try to store the random integer x into smart card. The procedural steps are as follow:
Step 1: The authorized mobile-sink can freely opt an identity PID j , a secret-key SK j and a random integer x ∈ Z * q . Afterwards, the mobile-sink determines H 2 (x ⊕ SK j ) and sends the message-request {PID j , H 2 (x ⊕ SK j )} to B St via a secure communication channel.
Step 2: After receiving the message-request {PID j , H 2 (x ⊕ SK j )}, the B St determines the following expressions:
Then, B St delivers a smart-card which is integrated of Certify j , V j , H j , A j to M S via a secure communication channel.
Step 3: After receiving the smart-card, the authorized mobile-sink stores back the random-integer x securely in the smart-card. Now, the smart-card is integrated of
The following illustrative diagram shows mobile-sink registration over base station.
When any user wishes to use M S to sense data in an appropriate network, then the user should insert a valid smart-card into the terminal to enter the credentials, such as identity PID j and secret-key SK j . The execution flows are as follows:
Step 1: The smart-card S C determines TS * j = V j ⊕ H 2 PID j H 2 x ⊕ SK j and H * j = H 2 TS * j to verify whether H * j is equal to H j or not. If the equality holds, then M S executes the subsequent steps. Otherwise, S C requests the user to provide the proper credentials, such as user identity and secret key.
Step 2: The smart-card determines a random-integer value rN j to determine the following:
then the mobile-sink sends the message-request PID j , b j , c j , rN j to B St via secure common channel.
Step 3: Upon receiving the message PID j , b j , c j , rN j from smart-card, B St performs the computation
After computation, B St verifies whether c * j = c j or not. If the equality holds, then B St determines M S as a legal mobile-sink to compute
Lastly, B St sends the computation parameters Q j , CLC DB S to M S .
Step 4: Upon receiving the parameters Q j , CLC DB S from B St , M S determines Q * j = H 2 PID j H 2 x ⊕ SK j rN j to verify whether Q * j = Q j or not. If the equation holds, then M S computes M K =ê cert j , p pub and LC DB S = D M K CLC DB S , where D M K is the decryption of E M K (.).
After the successful computation, M S stores the updated list of legal cluster heads LC DB S into its storage memory. Upon the successful of LC DB S , M S retains the complete database of legal cluster heads to run the subsequent step to ensure the authentication during message transmission.
Moreover, to obtain the legal cluster head, the above steps are periodically executed.
The steps of system login phase can be presented as:
Once the system login phase is completed successfully, M S can move into the WSN's coverage area to collect the sensing data. In order to authenticate its communication with CH j , M S has the procedural executions, which are as follows:
Step 1: While M S actuates its current vicinity into CH j , it transmits its connection-request to nearby CH j for user authentication.
Step 2: After receiving the connection-request, CH j sends its unique identity of CID j to the requested mobile-sink.
Step 3: Upon receiving the CID j , M S verifies the legitimacy of CH j using the un-compromised cluster database Step 5: Once the message parameter {∇,TS S } is received from CH j , M S determines V erify = H 2 S k1 PID j CID j TS S to check whether it holds with ∇ or not. If the verification is successful, M S uses the session key S k1 to establish a session with CH j .
The steps of system authentication phase can be presented as: Step 1: Initially, CH j computes the cipher text CT j = E S k2 Data j using the session key S k2 , where Data j is the internal storage data of CH j . Lastly, CH j sends the parameter CT j to M S .
Step 2: After receiving the parameter CT j from CH , M S determines CData j = E M K D S k1 CT j to stores its corresponding values in internal storage device or sends the value to B St directly, where M K =ê cert j , p pub . The aforesaid equation may be inferred as:
Hence, the verification proves that the storage data of M S is encrypted by M K .
Step 3: After successful verification, M S sends the transmission message PID j , CData j , b j , c j , rN j to B St , where b j , c j and rN j are computed in system login phase.
Step 4: Upon receiving the transmission message from M S , B St tries to extract PID j to compute the equations, which are as follows: The following diagram shows extraction of sensing data.
F. SECRET KEY UPDATE PHASE
In this phase, U ser can modify his / her secret key when he / she wants to change. The procedural steps of key update phase are as follows:
Step 1: U ser tries to enter his / her smart card into the user terminal to verify the credentials, such as PID j and SK j .
Step 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section is composed of stringent formal and informal security analysis of S-SAKA. The analysis result shows that the proposed S-SAKA framework not only offers security properties of authentication protocols for mutual authentication, session-key agreement and data confidentiality, but also prevents the various potential attacks, such as node-capture, stolen smart-card, key impersonation and privileged-insider.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
S-SAKA framework offers secret session-key agreement between a legal cluster head CH i , base station B S , smart card S C and a mobile-sink MS i and it is proven using BAN logic [19] . Assume that X and Y be the principles, P and Q be the statement / formula and s k be the secret key. The important notation used in the BAN logic is given in : If X trusts that X has just been communicated and thus Y ony perceives P, then X trusts that Y be certain of P.
Rule 3 -Belief:
X |≡PX |≡Q X |≡(P,Q) : If X trusts P and Q, then X beliefs in P and Q.
Rule 4 -Rule of Fresh-Concatenation:
X |≡ =P X |≡ =(P,Q) : If X trusts the freshness in key generation of P, then Y be certain of freshness in (P, Q).
Rule 5 -Rule of Jurisdiction:
: If X trusts that Y has influence over P and X believes Y in the accuracy of P, then X trusts in P.
To satisfy the security properties of AKA protocol, the proposed S-SAKA framework must be able to meet all the test goals, given in below.
The structural flow of BAN logic is as follows:
1. Messages in Generic Form:
Transmission of Messages in Idealized Form:
Messages in Hypotheses Form:
The idealized form of S-SAKA framework is examined on the base of BAN logic postulates and goal settings. The key proofs of S-SAKA are as follows:
-From the transmission message T M 1 , the S-SAKA has
-From H M 2 , P 1 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires
-From H M 5 , P 3 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires (2) and Rule (4), the S-SAKA obtains 5 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA gets
-From H M 1 , P 7 and Rule (1), the S-SAKA acquires (2) and Rule (4), the S-SAKA obtains 9 and Rule (3), the S-SAKA achieves
-Again, from H M 6 , P 10 and Rule (5), the S-SAKA produces
←→ S C Goal 2 Provided the goals Goal 1 − Goal 4 , the S-SAKA protocol asserts that it uses a shared secret-key s k to establish a communication; and hence the proposed S-SAKA framework is proficient to achieve the proper mutual authentication, session-key agreement and confidentiality.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the informal security analysis of S-SAKA protocol is performed in which the adversary has some unique capabilities that are as follows:
1. The adversary is able to control over the communication channel especially with mobile-sink, clusterhead and base-station to do message intercept, insert, delete or modify any exchange of information. 2. The adversary may incur either user identity and secret key or the storage information of smart card but he / she cannot obtain both. For an instance, if the adversary obtains the user identity and secret key, he / she can't have any chance to obtain the storage information of smart card.
1) PROPER MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION-KEY AGREEMENT
In the authentication phase, the cluster-head CH j and mobilesink authenticate each other by the verification of j = e(Certify j .H t .H 1 CID j ) to validate the secret-session key S K 1 =ê(H t .Certify j , H t .H 1 CID j ). Using S.H 1 CID j , the cluster-head performs the computation, which is as follows:
On the other hand, the mobile-sink authenticates the cluster-head using Ver j = ∇ to render the transmission message {∇,TS S }. As the certificate authorization is given only for the authorized mobile-sink, the other cannot infer / forge to generate a valid authentic key value j . To establish a secure communication, the mobilesink and the cluster-head shares s session key S K 1 = e(H t .Certify j , H t .H 1 CID j ).Hence, the S-SAKA framework provides proper mutual authentication and session-key agreement.
2) DATA-CONFIDENTIALITY
In S-SAKA framework, to collect the sensing data, the mobile-sink should try to achieve the proper mutual authentication with cluster-head using shared session key. After the establishment of session key, the mobile-sink can acquire the sensing information through the knowledge of cluster-head. As the shared session key is kept secretly between the mobilesink and cluster-head, the adversary cannot deduce the Data j in plaintext. Thus, the S-SAKA framework claims that it can provide a secure communication between the mobile-sink and the cluster-head.
On the one hand, the secret-session key S K 1 = e(H t .Certify j , H t .H 1 CID j ) is interfaced between the cluster-head CH and the mobile-sink. On the other hand, the cluster-head determines CData j = E M K D S k1 CT j = CData j to save and send it to the base-station. Even if the adversary acquires the information of mobile-sink, he / she cannot infer Data j as it could not obtain the key value of M K . As the adversary cannot tamper the sensing-data without knowledge of S K , the S-SAKA framework provides dataconfidentiality for users.
3) RESILIENT TO NODE-CAPTURE ATTACK
The resistance of node-capture attack can be measured effectively with the elimination of network communication, which are compromised by N captured nodes directly [36] . Owing to inattentive property of WSNs', an adversary may capture the information of sensor-node or cluster-head. For your kind note, cluster-head has authentic identity CID j and secret key value S.H 1 CID j in initialization phase. Consequently, the adversary may have a chance to compromise the nodes, which are yet to communicate with mobile-sink and clusterhead. But then, the nodes, which are not compromised are still secure to establish the communication between mobilesink and cluster-head. Subsequently, the S-SAKA framework claims that the adversary cannot provide any security disruption for uncompromised cluster-head and mobile-sink.
According to [42] and [43] , the mobile-sink owner can deduce the recent updated cluster-head from LC DB S database, as soon as he / she has successfully logged into the base-station. Similarly, the mobile-sink can identify the compromised cluster-head timely to reject the compromised cluster-head. The un-compromised database table DB S is associated with the mobile-sink securely; and thus the adversary cannot affect / damage the secure communication between the cluster-head and mobile-sink. Hence, the S-SAKA framework is resilient to node-capture attack.
4) RESILIENT TO STOLEN SMART-CARD ATTACK
Assume that adversary obtains the smart-card of the user MS i ; and thus he / she acquires the details of
But then, the adversary can not deduce the users' unique identity PID j and secret-key SK j from Certify j , V j , H j and A j owing to one-way property of the hash function H 1 (.) and H 2 (.). Therefore, the adversary cannot compute a precise m 1 = H t .H 1 (PID j H 2 (x ⊕ SK j ) to form a valid request message m 1 , j , TS S . Therefore, the S-SAKA claims that it is resilient to stolen smart-card attack.
5) RESILIENT TO REPLAY ATTACK
Using replay attack, the adversary uses a falsified authentication process to acquire the system access. In order to deduce such false assumption, the S-SAKA uses timestamp TS S .
Assume an adversary wishes to launch a replay attack to infer the sensing data from cluster head CH . To extract the sensed data, the adversary needs to send an authentic message to CH . If the message m * 1 , * j , TS * s is found to be expired or already used by another mobile-sink M S , CH determines to be a susceptible behavior. Even though, the adversary changes the timestamp TS * s , he / she cannot find a proper * j without the key parameter of B st value S. On the other hand, an adversary may wish to launch a replay attack to intercept with authentic mobile-sink M S . To establish the communication, the adversary need to generate an authentic message {∇,TS S }. As the key parameter of B st value S is always kept secret between M S and B st , the adversary cannot determine a valid secret session key S k2 =ê m 1 , H t .r.H 1 CID j . Hence, the S-SAKA claims that the adversary cannot launch a replay attack without the proper computation of ∇ = H 2 S k1 PID j CID j TS S . This proves that the S-SAKA framework is resilient to replay attack.
6) RESILIENT TO KEY IMPERSONATION ATTACK
By using this attack, an adversary provides a forged information m * 1 , * j , TS * s to impersonate as a legitimate mobilesink M S as to overhear the sensing information. However, the adversary cannot infer / forge * j without the determination of Certify j . According to DL problem, it is very much difficult to derive the secret key parameter S using P and p pub . As a result, the adversary cannot determine S.H 1 (PID j H 2 x ⊕ SK j ) = Certify j and * j . The above analysis proves that S-SAKA framework is resilient to key impersonation attack.
7) RESILIENT TO PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In the system registration phase of S-SAKA framework, the mobile-sink owner U ser does not share his/her secret key SK j in plaintext form. But, he / she shares its information as H 2 (x ⊕ SK j ) to B st . As H 2 (.) is a one-way point secure hashing function, it is computationally not possible to obtain SK j . Moreover, the administrator or privileged B st cannot determine a valid SK j of U ser and thus he / she cannot impersonate as a legal user U ser to communicate with CH . Hence, the S-SAKA framework claims to be secure against the privileged-insider attack.
8) USER ANONYMITY AND INTRACTABILITY
In the system authentication phase, the S-SAKA framework uses mobile-sink M S to send the transmission message m 1 , j , TS S to cluster-head CH in turn to obtain a proper user authentication. As each message transmission has unique time stamp TS S that traverses between M S and CH , there will be no correlation of two authentic messages, namely m 1 , j , TS S and m * 1 , * j , TS * s . Moreover, as the message transmission has one way point to map hashing function, it is much difficult to retrieve PID j from m 1 . Hence, the S-SAKA framework claims that the adversary cannot identify any authentic mobile-sink or communication link launched by the same mobile-sink.
9) RESILIENT TO OFFLINE PASSWORD-GUESSING ATTACK
This attack is categorized into two cases that are as follows:
Case 1: Assume an insider wishes to know the information of legitimate user, such as user identity PID j and secret-key SK j during system registration. The registration request of insider {PID j , SK j )} is sent securely to the basestation. Besides, the insider has a smart-card, which are stolen from U ser . Even though he has the device access and user information, he / she could not derive a proper secret session key without the knowledge of secret key value x.
Case 2: Assume an outsider has stolen the smart-card of U ser . As a consequence, he / she can extract all the confidential information of smart-card, such as PID j , b j , c j , rN j , where
To derive a secret key SK j , the outsider needs to know secret key value x, which is a bilinear parameter corresponding to Z * p . As it is controlled and changed its value periodically by the base-station, the outsider cannot guess the proper secret key SK j to gain the U ser access.
The above analysis proves that the proposed S-SAKA framework can be resilient to offline password-guessing attack.
10) RESILIENT TO DoS ATTACK
Without proper user identity PID j and secret key SK j , none of the user can successfully log in to the systems. Even if they have stolen the smart card of legitimate user, they can infer the information like PID j , b j , c j , rN j ,
After that, the smart-card verifies whether H * j = H 2 TS * j is valid or not, where
As the timestamp TS j and secret value x periodically changes, they cannot derive a proper secret key SK j to gain the user access. Hence, the proposed S-SAKA framework is resilient to denial of service attack.
11) RESILIENT TO MANY LOGGED-IN USERS WITH THE SAME LOGIN IDENTITY ATTACK
In the proposed S-SAKA framework, the user must provide valid credentials {PID j , SK j )} to obtain the access of clusterhead through the knowledge of base-station, which verifies the secret value x to authorize the service access. As the secret value x is unique to U ser and controlled by base-station, the user redundancy cannot be determined using following expressions: A j = H 2 PID j x y as it is already in use. Hence, the proposed S-SAKA framework claim that it is resilient to many to many logged-in users with the same login identity attack.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the proposed S-SAKA framework is evaluated and compared with its related authentication schemes. The evaluation criteria of communication cost, some notation is defined as follows: T SH is defined as the execution time of one-way secure hashing function H 2 (.) .T MH is defined as the execution time of one-way point to map hashing function H 1 (.).
T P is defined as the computation time of bilinear pairing function.
T A is defined as the execution time of one-point additional operational function.
T ED is defined as the execution time of encryption and decryption algorithmic function.
T M is defined as the execution time of elliptic-curve scalar multiplication function.
In WSNs, energy efficiency is a major constraint and thus lightweight user authentication protocols are preferred to mitigate the computational cost of the systems.
In order to reduce the amount of computations required, the proposed S-SAKA protocol uses cost inexpensive operations like hashing function and less cost expensive operation, such as bilinear pairing, encryption/decryption and scalar multiplication operation. To evaluate the cryptographic operations employed, an extensive verification is performed using MIRACLE C/C++ library with the system features of 32-bit Windows 7 Operating Systems and Microsoft Visual C++. To examine realistically, the execution time of symmetric key encryption/decryption (AES − 128), elliptic-curve point scalar multiplication over finite-field f p and SHA − 1 hashing function are set as T P ≈ 0.0001 ms, T ED ≈ 0.1303 ms, T M ≈ 7.3529 ms and T SH ≈ T MH ≈ 0.0004 ms as referred in [22] . Table 3 demonstrates the communication efficiencies of the proposed S-SAKA and its related existing authentication schemes [17] - [22] during system login and authentication phase. Results show that, the computation cost of the bilinear pairing and scalar multiplication of proposed S-SAKA is comparatively short.
The examination results prove that the proposed S-SAKA has less communication overhead as it does not invoke the base-station to authenticate the mobile-sink and sensor node except during the secure communication establishment to provide seamless connectivity. Thus, it can be well suitable for WSN's environment in relation with the existing authentication schemes [17] - [22] . Table 3 compares the communication overhead involved in system login and authentication phases for proposed and other existing schemes [17] - [22] . While using SHA-1 hashing, the one-way hash function is assumed to be 160 − bits [20 bytes] . In addition, for each random nonce, the identity of sensor node is set to be 152 − bits [19 bytes] . In proposed S-SAKA, during system login phase, the login message transmission request T Msg1 = PID j , b j , c j , rN j and T Msg2 = Q j , CLC DB S involves 78 bytes and 39 bytes respectively. In the course of system authentication and key agreement phase, the message transmission request T Msg3 = m 1 , j , TS S and T Msg4 = PID j , CData j , b j , c j , rN j encompasses 58 bytes and 98 bytes. As a result, during system login and authentication phase, the communication overhead is cumulated as follows: [78 + 39 + 58 + 98] = 273bytes. On the other hand, the communication overheads involved in system login and authentication phases for Deebak [17] , Turkanović et al. [18] , Farash et al. [19] , Das et al. [20] , Amin and Biswas [21] and Srinivas et al. [22] and 353 bytes respectively. It is observed that the proposed S-SAKA scheme provides less communication overhead in comparison with other existing authentication schemes [17] - [22] .
Although the computation and execution times of mobile sink, cluster head and base stations are lower than the proposed protocol, total execution time in term of milliseconds the proposed S-SAKA performs lowest time. It is also remarked that S-SAKA can divide the protected resources in IoT-based environments into a number of assertion levels (= n). Assuming a total count of assertion levels n equal to 3, threshold values of the assertion levels can be as shown in Table 4 .
g ti ∈ [0, 1] and represents the assertion level threshold value of the i th assertion level that can be calculated by g ti = (i − 1) * 1 n . g ti reflects how confident the S-SAKA system must be about a user in order to assert his/her identity before granting access to them. It defines a control parameter representing the rate of change of the assertion value and referred to as g. This parameter can be used to control the speed by which the assertion value in safety-inspired applications' increases or decreases.
Changing the value of g affects how the system confidence is about a user access as shown in Fig. 2 . In this figure when g is set to values between 0.1 and 0.5, the S-SAKA system confidence increases slowly and needs at least 6 events for the global assertion value to reach the next threshold value. This setting would be useful in IoT environments, where high security levels are a must such as the case in safety-inspired applications. However, when g has high values such 0.7 to 1.0, the system confidence rises much faster with less number of events to reach the second level; this setting would be useful for more relaxed IoT environments.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, WSN security schemes are considered in terms of authentication and secure key agreement, which can be essential particularly for the IoT applications for public safety applications with cloud interactions. Enhancement of security framework can be essential for public safety paradigm since the IoT systems can be used for communication of sensitive information. Addressing the potential security based challenges, Seamless secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) framework using bilinear-pairing and ellipticcurve cryptosystems has been proposed for the security issues, like data confidentiality, mutual authentication, session-key agreement, user anonymity, intractability and resilient to node-capture, key impersonation, password guessing and stolen smart-card attack. While using mobile-sink in WSNs, the S-SAKA framework does not only solve some major security issues, but also ensures a seamless connectivity to reduce the computation and communication cost of the network systems. In terms of authentication and authorization, recent studies on formal verifications that are based on bilinear pairing and elliptic-curve cryptosystems [44] are not provided for WSNs. As stated earlier, considering life-time of WSN, security aspects are critical and new solutions should be provided effectively and efficiently. The formal verification method and critical analyses performed prove that proposed S-SAKA provides mutual authentication, secure key agreement and data confidentiality. Furthermore, the results of performance evaluation show the reduced overhead of the proposed approach compared to the existing studies. Thus, the proposed S-SAKA framework can be well suited to the environments where public safety networks make use of IoT based applications with wireless sensors networks.
